Transcendental concepts like logic, mathematics and Plato’s Universals all point to mental constructs that are beyond any on mind. Without logic, we could not communicate on a fundamental level. These transcendentals point to a noumenal realm of thought. I think, therefore, I am? Here, we look at syllogisms that all point to a greater construct of thought.
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The Applicability of Mathematics (Transcendental Metaphysical Arguments)
1) The applicability of mathematics to the physical world requires explanation.
2) The best explanation of the applicability of mathematics to the physical world is that God modeled the physical world under mathematical structures.
3) So, the applicability of mathematics to the physical world is evidence of God’s existence.
● Eugene Wigner, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences,” Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 13/1 (1960), pp. 1-14.
● Mark Steiner, The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem (Harvard, 1998).
● William Lane Craig, “God and the Applicability of Mathematics,” in Ruloff and Horban (ed.), Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology (Bloomsbury, 2021), pp.##.
The Global Economy Argument
1) We should accept the best theory of abstracta.
2) The best theory of abstracta will secure the virtues of both anti-realism (economic) and realism (necessity and objectivity).
3) Only theism can secure the virtues of both anti-realism (economic) and realism (necessity and objectivity) about abstracta.
4) So, theism provides the best theory of abstracta.
5) So, we should accept theism.
● Brian Leftow, God and Necessity (Oxford, 2012).
Argument from Modality
1) Modalities are grounded in powers.
2) Modalities can be grounded in powers only if we ground them in the powers of an omnipotent being.
3) So, we ground modalities in the powers of an omnipotent being.
● Brian Leftow, “The Argument from Possibility,” in Walls & Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford,
2018), pp. 406-416.
Nomological Arguments (Transcendental, Metaphysical Arguments)
Laws as Counterfactuals of Divine Freedom
1) Laws of nature are (i) prior to that which they describe, and (ii) subjunctive in structure.
2) The best explanation of laws of nature being this way is that they are counterfactuals of freedom.
3) So, probably, laws of nature are counterfactuals of freedom.
4) Laws of nature can be counterfactuals of freedom only if they are counterfactuals of freedom of a transcendent agent with an absolutely stable character who governs the relevant parts of reality.
5) So, probably, there is a transcendent agent with an absolutely stable character who governs the relevant parts of reality.
● Del Ratzsch, “Nomo(theo)logical Necessity,” Faith and Philosophy 4/4 (1987), pp. 383-402
A Scholastic Argument
1) Natural laws exist and are (i) transcendent yet (ii) immanent.
2) Natural laws can be (i) transcendent yet (ii) immanent only if we ground them in a transcendent yet immanent being.
3) So, natural laws are grounded in a transcendent yet immanent being.
4) If there is a transcendent yet immanent being, it’s God.
5) So, God exists.
● John Peterson, “Law and Thomistic Exemplarism,” The Thomist 60/1 (1996), pp. 81-108.
From Induction to Laws to God
1) Induction is justified.
2) Induction is justified only if there is a genuine regularity of nature.
3) There can be genuine regularity of nature only if there are natural laws governing nature.
4) So, there are natural laws governing nature.
5) The best explanation of there being natural laws governing nature is if God created them and imposes them on nature.
6) So, probably, God exists.
● John Foster, The Divine Lawmaker: Lectures on Induction, Laws of Nature, and the Existence of God (Oxford, 2004).
From Induction to God
1) We’re justified in believing induction is reliable.
2) We’re justified in believing induction is reliable only if we’re justified in believing the universe started in a low-entropy state.
3) We’re justified in believing the universe started in a low-entropy state only if theism is true.
4) So, we’re justified in believing induction is reliable only if theism is true.
5) So, theism is true.
● Bradley Monton, “Atheistic Induction by Boltzmann Brains,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 184-197.
see also: Metaphysical Arguments for God and Moral Arguments
