The Simplicity of Divine Laws

1) The best naturalistic theory of the laws of nature are that they are determination relations between properties.
2) If laws of nature are determination relations between properties, there are two fundamentally different kinds of causation–event causation and agent causation.
3) All else being equal, we should prefer simpler theories to more complex theories.
4) If laws of nature are regularites imposed on nature by God, there is just one kind of causation–agent causation.
5) So, all else being equal, we should prefer the theistic theory of laws of nature to the naturalistic theory.

● Richard Swinburne, “Relations Between Universals, or Divine Laws?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84/2 (2006), pp. 179-189.

The Incompleteness of Nature (Laws of Nature, Divine Law)

1) There is genuine ontic indeterminacy.
2) Material objects are not radically ontologically incomplete.
3) If there is genuine ontic indeterminacy, material objects can be ontologically complete only if something more fundamental than matter completes them.
4) So, material objects can be ontologically complete only if something more fundamental than matter completes them.
5) So, something more fundamental than matter completes material objects.
6) The only thing than could be more fundamental than matter that could complete material objects is a God-like mind.
7) So, a God-like mind exists.

● Bruce Gordon, “The Necessity of Sufficiency: The Argument from the Incompleteness of Nature,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 417-445.

Axiological Arguments

Aquinas’ Fourth Way (Laws of Nature, Divine Law)

1) Things are more or less good, true, noble, etc.
2) Things are more or less good, true, noble, etc. only if they are so by resemblance to something maximally good, true, noble, etc.
3) So, there is something maximally good, true, noble, etc.
4) If there is something maximally good, true, noble, etc., it’s God.
5) So, God exists.

The Deontic Argument

Axiarchic Principle: If x ought to exist, x exists.
1) God ought to exist.
2) If God ought to exist, God exists.
3) So, God exists.

● John Leslie, Value and Existence (Blackwell, 1979).

The Modal Deontic Argument

Modal Axiarchic Principle: If x ought to exist, x possibly exists.
1) God ought to exist.
2) If God ought to exist, God possibly exists.
3) So, God possibly exists.
4) If God possibly exists, God exists.
5) So, God exists.

● Carl Kordig, “A Deontic Argument for God’s Existence,” Nous 15/2 (1981), pp. 207-208.
● William Vallicella, “Does God Exist Because He Ought to Exist?” in Szatkowski (ed.), Ontology of Theistic Beliefs (De Gruyter, 2018), pp.
205–212.

See also: Metaphysical Arguments for God and Mo’ Metaphysics